Many practical MACs are designed by iterating applications of some xed-input-length FIL primitive, namely one like a block cipher or compression function that only applies to data of a xed length. Existing security analyses of these constructions either require a stronger security property from the FIL primitive eg. pseudorandomness than the unforgeability required of the nal MAC, or, as in the case of HMAC, make security assumptions about the iterated function itself. In this paper we consider the design of iterated MACs under the minimal assumption that the given FIL primitive is itself a MAC. We look at three popular transforms, namely CBC, Feistel and the Merkle-Damg ard method, and ask for each whether it preserves unforgeability. We show that the answer is no in the rst two cases and yes in the third. The last yields an alternative cryptographic hash function based MAC which is secure under weaker assumptions than existing ones.
Introduction
Directly from scratch designed cryptographic primitives for example block ciphers or compression functions are typically xed input-length" FIL: they operate on inputs of some small, xed length. However, usage calls for variable input-length" VIL primitives: ones that can process inputs of longer, and varying lengths. Much cryptographic e ort goes into the problem of transforming FIL primitives to VIL primitives. To mention just two popular examples: the various modes of operation of block ciphers address this problem when the given FIL primitive is a block cipher and the desired VIL primitive a data encryption scheme; and the Merkle-Damg ard iteration method 15, 10 addresses this problem when the given FIL primitive is a collision-resistant compression function and the desired VIL primitive i s a collision-resistant hash function. In this paper, we will address this problem for the design of VIL-MACs in the case where the given FIL primitive is itself a MAC, which corresponds to a weak security assumption on the FIL primitive in this context. Let us begin by recalling some background. We then describe more precisely the problem we consider, its motivation and history, and our results.
Background
MACs. Recall that a message authentication code MAC is the most common mechanism for assuring integrity of data communicated between parties who share a secret key k. A MAC is speci ed by a function g that takes the key k and data x to produce a tag = gk;x. The sender transmits x; and the receiver veri es that gk;x= . The required security property is unforgeability, namely that even under a chosen-message attack, it be computationally infeasible for an adversary not having the secret key k be able to create a valid pair x; which is new" meaning x has not already been authenticated by the legitimate parties. As the main tool for ensuring data integrity and access control, much e ort goes into the design of secure and e cient MACs, and many constructions are known. These include block cipher based MACs like the CBC MAC 1 or XOR MACs 8 ; hash function based MACs like HMAC 2 or MDx-MAC 19 ; and universal hash function based MACs 9, 22 . Many of the existing constructions of MACs fall into the category of FIL to VIL transforms. For example the CBC MAC iterates applications of a block cipher the underlying FIL primitive, while hash function based MACs iterate implicitly or explicitly applications of the underlying compression function. Assumptions underlying the transforms. Analyses of existing block cipher based MACs make stronger assumptions on the underlying FIL primitive than the unforgeability required of the nal VIL-MAC. For example, security analyses of the CBC or XOR MACs provided in 5, 8 model the underlying block cipher as a pseudorandom function, assumed to be unpredictable" in the sense of 11 , a requirement more stringent than unforgeability.
The security analysis of HMAC 1 provided in 2 makes two assumptions: that the appropriately keyed compression function is a MAC and also that the iterated compression function is weakly collision resistant". Thus, the security of HMAC is not shown to follow from an assumption only about the underlying FIL primitive.
Universal hash function based MACs don't usually fall in the FIL to VIL paradigm, but on the subject of assumptions one should note that they require the use of block ciphers modeled as pseudorandom functions to mask the output of the unconditionally secure universal hash function, and thereby use assumptions stronger than unforgeability on the underlying primitives. 1 To be precise, the security analysis we refer to is that of NMAC, of which HMAC i s a v ariant.
From FIL-MACs to VIL-MACs
The Problem. We are interested in obtaining VIL-MACs whose security can be shown to follow from only the assumption that the underlying FIL primitive is itself a MAC. In other words, we wish to stay within the standard paradigm of transforming a FIL primitive to a VIL-MAC, but we wish the analysis to make a minimal requirement on the security of the given FIL primitive: it need not be unpredictable, but need only be a MAC itself, namely unforgeable. This is, we feel, a natural and basic question, yet one that surprisingly has not been systematically addressed. Benefits of reduced assumptions. It is possible that an attack against the pseudorandomness of a block cipher may be found, yet not one against its unforgeability. A proof of security for a block cipher based MAC that relied on the pseudorandomness assumption is then rendered void. This does not mean there is an attack on the MAC, but it means the MAC is not backed by a security guarantee in terms of the cipher. If, however, the proof of security had only made an unforgeability assumption, it would still stand and lend a security guarantee to the MAC construction. Similarly, collision-resistance of a compression function might be found to fail, but the unforgeability of some keyed version of this function may still beintact. This is true for example for the compression function of MD5. Thus, if the security analysis of a keyed compression-function based MAC relied only on an unforgeability assumption, the security guarantee on the MAC w ould remain.
Another possibility enabled by this approach w ould be to design FIL-MACs from scratch. Since the security requirement i s w eaker than for block ciphers, we might be able to get FIL-MACs that are faster than block ciphers, and thereby speed up message authentication.
Our results
The bene t of a VIL-MAC with a security analysis relying only on the assumption that the FIL primitive i s a M A C would be greatest if the construction were an existing, in use one, whose security could now bejusti ed under a weaker assumption. In that case, existing MAC implementations could be left unmodi ed, but bene t from an improved security guarantee arising from relying only on a weaker assumption. Accordingly, w e focus on existing transforms or slight v ariants and ask whether they preserve unforgeability. CBC MAC. The rst and most natural candidate is the CBC MAC. Recall that given a FIL primitive f : f0; 1g f 0 ; 1 g l ! f 0 ; 1 g l its CBC MAC is the transform CBC f , taking key k 2 f0; 1g and input x = x 1 : : : x n 2 f 0 ; 1 g ln to return y n , where y i = fk;y i,1 x i for 1 i n, and y 0 = 0 l . W e already know that if f is a pseudorandom function then CBC f is a secure MAC 5 , and the question is whether the assumption that f itself is only a MAC is enough to prove that CBC f is a secure MAC. We show that it is not. We do this by exhibiting a f that is a secure MAC, but for which there is an attack showing that CBC f is not a secure MAC. This relies of course on the assumption that some secure FIL-MAC exists, since otherwise the question is void. MD method. Next we look at Damg ard's method 10 for transforming a keyed compression function f : f0; 1g f 0 ; 1 g + b ! f 0 ; 1 g into a full-edged hash function. 2 Actually our method di ers slightly in the way it handles input-length variability, which it does by using another key.
Our nested, iterated construction, NI f , takes keys k 1 ; k 2 and input x = x 1 : : : x n 2 f 0 ; 1 g nb to return fk 2 ; y n khjxji, where y i = fk 1 ; y i , 1 k x i for 1 i n and y 0 = 0 and hjxji is the length of x written as a binary string of length exactly b bits. 2 The construction of Damg ard is essentially the same as that of Merkle, except that in the latter, the given compression function is keyless, while in the former, it is keyed. Since MACs are keyed, we m ust use Damg ard's setting here.
Although the construction is essentially the one used in the collision-resistant hash setting, the analysis needs to bedi erent. This is because of two central di erences between MACs and hash functions: MACs rely for their security on a secret key, while hash functions which, in the Damg ard setting, do use a key make this key public; and the security properties in question are di erent unforgeability for MACs, and collision-resistance for hash functions.
We show that if f is a secure MAC then so is NI f . The analysis has several steps. As an intermediate step in the analysis we use the notion of weak-collision resistance of 2 , and one of our lemmas provides a connection between this and unforgeability.
An appropriately keyed version of the compression function of any existing cryptographic hash function can play the role of f above, as illustrated in Section 4.1. This provides another solution to the problem of using keyed compression functions to design MACs. In comparison with HMAC, the nested, iterated construction has lower throughput because each iteration of the compression function must use a key. Implementation also requires direct access to the compression function, as opposed to being implementable only by calls to the hash function itself. On the other hand, the loss in performance is low, it is still easy to implement, and the supporting security analysis makes weaker assumptions than that of HMAC.
Feistel. The Feistel transform is another commonly used method of increasing the amount of data one can process with a given FIL primitive. The basic transform doubles the input length of a given function f. The security of this transform as a function of the number of rounds r has been extensively analyzed for the problem of transforming a pseudorandom function into a pseudorandom permutation: Luby and Racko 14 showed that two rounds do not su ce for this purpose, but three do. We ask whether r rounds of Feistel on a MAC f result in a MAC. The answer is easily seen to be no for r = 2 . But we also show that it remains no for r = 3, meaning that the 3-round Feistel transform that turns pseudorandom functions into pseudorandom permutations does not preserve unforgeability. Furthermore, even more rounds do not appear to help in this regard.
Related work
The FIL to VIL question that we address for MACs is an instance of a classic one, which has been addressed before for many other primitives and has played an important role in the development of the primitives in question. The attraction of the paradigm is clear: It is easier to design and do security analyses for the smaller", FIL primitives, and then build the VIL primitive on top of them.
The modes of operation of block ciphers were probably the earliest constructions in this area, but an analysis in the light of this paradigm is relatively recent 4 . Perhaps the best known example is the Merkle-Damg ard 15, 10 iteration method used in the case of collision-resistant functions. Another early example is probabilistic public-key encryption, where Goldwasser and Micali showed that bit-by-bit encryption of a message preserves semantic security 12 . The FIL primitive here is encryption of a single bit. Extensive e ort has been put into this problem for the case of pseudorandom functions the problem is to turn a FIL pseudorandom function into a VIL one with variants of the CBC MAC construction 5, 18 and the cascade construction 3 being solutions. Bellare and Rogaway considered the problem and provided solutions for TCR target-collision-resistant hashing 6 , a notion of hashing due to Naor and Yung 17 which the latter had called universal one-way hashing.
Curiously, the problem of transforming FIL-MACs to VIL-MACs has not been systematically addressed prior to our work. However, some constructions are implicit. Speci cally, Merkle's hash tree construction 16 can beanalyzed in the case of MACs. Bellare, Goldreich and Goldwasser use such a design to build incremental MACs 7 , and thus a result saying that the tree design transforms FIL-MACs to VIL-MACs seems implicit here. We denote by Succ mac F A the probability that the outcome of the experiment ForgeA; F is 1.
We associate to F its insecurity function, de ned for any i n tegers t; q; by InSec mac F t; q; def = max A f Succ mac F A g :
Here the maximum is taken over all adversaries A with running time" t, number of queries" q, and total message length" . We put the resource names in quotes because they need to be properly de ned, and in doing so we adopt some important conventions. Speci cally, resources pertain to the experiment ForgeA; F rather than the adversary itself. The running time" of A is de ned as the time taken by the experiment ForgeA; F we call this the actual running time" plus the size of the code implementing algorithm A, all this measured in some xed RAM model of computation. We stress that the actual running time includes the time of all operations in the experiment F orgeA; F; speci cally it includes the time for key generation, computation of answers to oracle queries, and even the time for the nal veri cation. To measure the cost of oracle queries we let Q A bethe set of all oracle queries made by A, and let Q = Q A f m g beunion of this with the message in the forgery. Then the numberofqueries q is de ned as jQj, meaning m is counted because of the veri cation query involved. Note also that consideration of these sets means a repeated query is not double-counted. Similarly the total message length is the sum of the lengths of all messages in Q. These conventions will simplify the treatment of concrete security.
The insecurity function is the maximum likelihood of the security of the message authentication scheme F being compromised by a n a d v ersary using the indicated resources. We will speak informally of a secure MAC"; this means a MAC for which the value of the insecurity function is low" even for reasonably high" parameter values. When exactly to call a MAC secure is not something we can pin down ubiquitously, because it is so context dependent. So the term secure will be used only in discussion, and results will be stated in terms of the concrete insecurity functions. 3 The CBC MAC does not preserve unforgeability Here k 2 f 0 ; 1 g is the key, and x i is the i-th l-bit block of the input message.
We know that if f is a pseudorandom function then CBC f is a secure MAC 5 . Here we show that the weaker requirement that f itself is only a secure MAC does not su ce to guarantee that CBC f is a secure MAC. Thus, the security of the CBC MAC needs relatively strong assumptions on the underlying primitive.
We stress that the number of message blocks n is xed. If not, splicing attacks are well-known to break the CBC MAC. But length-variability can be dealt with in a variety o f w a ys cf. 5, 18 , and since the results we show here are negative, they are only strengthened by the restriction to a xed n.
We prove our claim by presenting an example of a MAC f which is secure, but for which w e can present an attack against CBC f . We construct f under the assumption that some secure MAC exists, since otherwise there is no issue here at all.
Assume we h a v e a secure MAC g: f0; 1g f 0 ; 1 g 2 m ! f 0 ; 1 g m whose input length is twice its output length. We set l = 2 m and transform g into another MAC f : f0; 1g f 0 ; 1 g l ! f 0 ; 1 g l .
W e show that f is a secure MAC but CBC f is not. Below we present f as taking a -bit key k and an l-bit input a = a 1 ka 2 which w e view as divided into two m-bit halves.
Algorithm fk;a 1 a 2 gk;a 1 a 2 Return a 1 That is, f k on any input simply returns g k on the same input, concatenated with the rst half of f k 's input. It should beclear intuitively that f is a secure MAC given that g is a secure MAC, because the output of f contains a secure MAC on the input, and the adversary already knows the data a 1 anyway. The following claim relates the securities more precisely. Claim 3.1 Let g;f be as above. Then InSec mac f t; q; InSec mac g t; q; . Proof: Let A f beany forger attacking f, having running time t, numberof queries q, and total message length . We design a forger A g attacking g such that Succ mac g A g Succ mac f A f 1 and furthermore A g has the same running time, numberof queries and total message length as A f . The claim follows from the de nition of the insecurity function. The algorithm A g uses A f as a subroutine, itself replying to the oracle queries of A f to beable to execute the latter. It is presented below. Here A g invokes its oracle gk;to implement fk;and thus can reply to the oracle queries of A f . It is easy to check that A g will output a successful forgery of g if A f outputs a successful forgery of f, and both adversaries use the same resources. Equation 1 follows.
We n o w show that the CBC MAC method is not secure if we use the function f as the underlying base function. The following claim says that there is an attack on CBC f , which after obtaining the correct tag of only one chosen message, succeeds in forging the tag of a new message. The attack is for the case n = 2 of two block messages, so that both the chosen message and the one whose tag is forged have length 2l. Here F rst de ned the 2l bit message x. It then obtained its l-bit tag from the oracle, and split it into two halves. It then constructed the l-bit blocks x 0 1 ; x 0 2 as shown, and concatenated them to get x 0 , which it output along with the claimed tag 1 a 1 .
To show that this is a successful attack, we need to check t w o things. First that the forgery is valid, meaning CBC f k;x 0 = 1 a 1 , and second that the message x 0 is new, meaning x 0 6 = x. Let's begin with the second. We note that the last m bits of x 0 are a 2 a 1 . But F chose a 1 ; a 2 so that a 2 6 = a 1 so a 2 a 1 6 = 0 m . But the last m bits of x are zero. So x 0 6 = x. Now let us verify that CBC f k;x 0 = 1 a 1 . By the de nition of f in terms of g, and by the de nition of CBC f , we h a v e CBC f k;x = fk;fk;a 1 a 2 0 m 0 m = fk;gk;a 1 a 2 a 1 = gk;gk;a 1 a 2 a 1 kgk;a 1 a 2 :
This implies that 1 = gk;a 1 a 2 and 2 = gk; 1 a 1 in the above code. as desired.
The construct f above that makes the CBC MAC fail is certainly somewhat contrived; indeed it is set up to make the CBC MAC fail. Accordingly, one reaction to the above is that it does not tell us anything about the security of, say, DES-CBC, because DES does not behave like the function f above. This reaction is not entirely accurate. The question here is whether the assumption that the underlying cipher is a MAC is su cient to be able to prove that its CBC is also a MAC. The above says that no such proof can exist. So with regard to DES-CBC, we are saying that its security relies on stronger properties of DES than merely being a MAC, for example pseudorandomness. 4 The NI construction preserves unforgeability
Here we de ne the nested, iterated transform of a FIL-MAC and show that the result is a VIL-MAC.
The construction
We are given a family of functions f : f0; 1g f 0 ; 1 g + b ! f 0 ; 1 g which takes the form of a keyed compression function, and we will associate to this the nested iterated NI function NI f . The construction is speci ed in two steps; we rst de ne the iteration of f and then show how to get NI f from that. See Figure 1 for the pictorial description. Construction. As the notation indicates, the input to any instance function fk; of the given family has length`+ b bits. We view such an input as divided into two parts: a chaining variable of length`bits and a data block of length b bits. We associate to f its iteration, a family
where L is to be de ned, and for any k ey k and string x of length at most L we de ne: Comparing our construction to HMAC NMAC, the di erence, roughly speaking, is that HMAC is based on a hash function like MD5 or SHA-1 that uses a compression function that is keyless, and iterated in the Merkle style 15 . Had we instead started with a hash function that iterated a keyed compression function in the Damg ard style, and applied the HMAC transform to it, we w ould end up with essentially our construction. This tells us that the Damg ard's setting and construction have a nice extra feature not highlighted before: they adapt to the MAC setting in a direct way.
Another di erence between our construction and NMAC lies in how the output of the internal functions of the nested functions are formed. Our internal function IT f appends the length of the message and the appended length is a part of the function's output whereas F in NMAC applies the base function once more on the length of the message. Instantiation. Appropriately keying the compression function of some existing cryptographic hash function will yield a candidate for f above. For example, let sha-1: f0; 1g 160+512 ! f 0 ; 1 g 160 be the compression function of SHA-1. We can key it via its 160-bit chaining variable. We would then use the 512 bit regular input as the input of the keyed function. This means we m ust further subdivide it into two parts, one to play the role of a new chaining variable and another to be the actual data input. This means we set =`= 160 and b = 352, and de ne the keyed sha-1 compression function ksha-1 : f0; 1g 160 f 0 ; 1 g 160+352 ! f 0 ; 1 g 160 by ksha-1k ;akb = sha-1kkakb ;
for any k ey k 2 f 0 ; 1 g 160 , a n y a 2 f 0 ; 1 g 160 and any b 2 f 0 ; 1 g 352 . Now, we can implement NI ksha-1 and this will beasecure MAC under the assumption that ksha-1 was a secure MAC on 352 bit messages. Note that under this instantiation, each application of sha-1 will process 352 bits of the input, as opposed to 512 in a regular application of sha-1 as used in SHA-1 or HMAC-SHA-1. So the throughput of NI ksha-1 is a factor of 352=512 0:69 times that of HMAC-SHA-1. Also, implementation of NI ksha-1 calls for access to sha-1; unlike HMAC-SHA-1, it cannot be implemented by calls only to SHA-1. On the other hand, the security of NI ksha-1 relies on weaker assumptions than that of HMAC-SHA-1. The analysis of the latter assumes that ksha-1 is a secure MAC and that the iteration of sha-1 is weakly collision-resistant; the analysis of NI ksha-1 makes only the former assumption.
Security analysis
Our assumption is that f above is a secure FIL-MAC. The following theorem says that under this condition alone the nested iterated construction based on f is a secure VIL-MAC. The theorem also indicates the concrete security of the transform. Tightness of the bound. There is an appreciable loss in security above, with the insecurity of the nested iterated construct being greater than that of the original f by a factor of roughly the square of the number=b of messages in a chosen-message attack on f. This loss in security is however unavoidable. Iterated constructs of this nature continue to besubject to the birthday attacks illustrated by Preneel and Van Oorschott 19 , and these attacks can be used to show that the above bound is essentially tight. Proof approach. A seemingly natural approach to proving Theorem 4.1 would be to try to imitate the analyses of Merkle and Damg ard 15, 10 which showed that transforms very similar to ours preserve collision-resistance. This approach h o w ever turned out to be less straightforward to implement here than one might imagine, due to our having to deal with forgeries rather than collisions. Accordingly we take a di erent approach. We rst reduce the question of forgeries to one about a certain kind of collision-resistance, namely weak-collision resistance", showing that the insecurity of our construct as a MAC can be bounded in terms of its weak collision-resistance and the insecurity o f the original f as a MAC. We can bound the weak collision-resistance of the iterated construct in terms of the weak collision-resistance of the original f using the approach o f 15, 10 , and nally bound the weak-collision resistance of f in terms of its insecurity a s a MAC.
Putting the three together yields the theorem. Underlying many of these steps are general lemmas, and we state them in their generality since they might beof independent i n terest. In particular, we highlight the connections between weak collision-resistance and MACs. We need to begin, however, by s a ying what is weak collisionresistance. Weak Collision-resistance. In the usual attack model for nding collisions, the adversary is able to compute the hash function for which it seeks collisions; either it is a single, public function, or, if a family F, the key k de ning the map F k for which the adversary seeks collisions is given to the adversary. In the weak collision-resistance setting as de ned in 2 , the adversary seeking to nd collisions for F k is not given k, but rather has oracle access to F k . Weak collision-resistance is thus a less stringent requirement than standard collision-resistance. As before the maximum is taken over all adversaries A with running time" t, n umber of queries" q, and total message length" , the quantities in quotes being measured with respect to the experiment FindWeakColA; F, analogously to the way they were measured in the de nition of InSec mac described in Section 2. Speci cally the running time is the actual execution time of FindWeakColA; F plus the size of the code of A. We let Q = Q A f m; m 0 g where Q A is the set of all queries made by A. Then q = jQj and is the sum of the lengths of all messages in Q.
Reduction to WCR. We bound the insecurity of the nested construct as a MAC in terms of its weak-collision resistance and MAC insecurity of the original function. The following generalizes and restates a theorem on NMAC from 2 . In our setting h will beIT f , and then N becomes NI f . The proof is an adaptation of the proof in 2 , and for completeness is given in Appendix A. To prove Theorem 4.1 we will apply the above lemma with h = IT f . Accordingly our task now reduces to bounding the weak collision-resistance insecurity of IT f . But remember that we w ant this bound to be in terms of the insecurity o f f a s a M A C. We t h us obtain the bound in two steps. We rst bound the weak collision-resistance of IT f in terms of the weak collision-resistance of f, and then bound the latter via its insecurity a s a M A C.
Weak Collision-Resistance of IT f . We now show that if f is a weak collision-resistant function family, then the iterated construction IT f is also a weak collision-resistant function family. The proof is analogous to those in 15, 10 which analyze similar constructs with regard to standard not weak collision-resistance. To extend them one must rst observe that their reductions make only black-box use of the underlying function instances and can thus be implemented in the weak collision-resistance setting via the oracle for the function instance. Second, our way of handling the length variability, although di erent, can beshown to work. Finally, we provide the concrete security analysis needed to establish the quantitative security claims above. The proof is given in Appendix A.2. Given the above two lemmas our task has reduced to bounding the weak collision-resistance insecurity o f f in terms of its MAC insecurity. The connection is actually much more general.
Weak Collision-Resistance of any MAC. We show that any secure MAC i s w eakly collisionresistant, although there is a loss in security in relating the two properties. This is actually the main lemma in our proof, and may be of general interest. Luby and Racko showed that FST 2 f is not pseudorandom even if f is pseudorandom 14 . This does not directly tell us anything about whether FST 2 f is a secure MAC given that f is a secure MAC. But in fact it is easy to design an attack showing that FST 2 f is not a secure MAC even if f is a secure MAC. Note that the following claim is very strong in the sense that it holds for all f: No matter what function family f you start with in particular, it could be a secure MAC o r even pseudorandom, applying the two-round Feistel transform to it results in a family for which there exists a simple attack to break it as a MAC. 
This ends the proof.
We now go on to the more interesting case of three rounds, where the transform is known to be pseudorandomness preserving. We show that it is nonetheless not unforgeability preserving in general. Namely the assumption that f is a secure MAC does not su ce to guarantee that FST 3 f is a secure MAC. We prove our claim by presenting an attack against FST 3 f when f is the MAC of Section 3 for which w e had presented an attack against CBC f . Thus, the claim is not as strong as for the two-round case where we w ere able to show that the two-round We can easily see that the forgery is valid by examining the values in the table. The second requirement that x is new can be achieved with high probability if the adversary chooses the strings L 1 0 , L 2 0 , and L 3 0 randomly. If the said strings are chosen randomly, then the l-bit left-half of each queried string becomes random and the probability of the forgery string x matching any one of the four queried strings is very small, speci cally at most 42 ,l . This means that the probability of the forgery being new and valid is 1 , 4 2 ,l as claimed.
A Proofs of Lemmas
A.1 Proof of Lemma 4.2
Let A N be a forger achieving the best possible success in attacking N, meaning it has resources at most t; q; and success Succ mac N A N equal to InSec mac N t; q; . We will construct two adversaries, A f and A h , the rst a forger attacking the MAC f and the second a weak collision-nder attacking h, so that the resources used by A f will be at most t; q; qb +` while those used by A h will be at most t; q; , and furthermore while using the claimed resources.
Algorithms A f and A h will both use A N as a subroutine, themselves providing answers to the oracle queries of A N . Algorithm A f has an oracle for fk 2 ; where k 2 is a random key, and is trying to output a f-forgery, as per experiment F orgeA f ; f . In order to simulate the oracle fk 2 ; h k 1 ; that A N expects to get, A f will pick k 1 at random, compute hk 1 ; itself, and then use its oracle to compute fk 2 ; on the outcome. Algorithm A h has an oracle for hk 1 ; where k 1 is a random key, and is trying to nd a h-collision, as per experiment FindWeakColA h ; h . In order to simulate the oracle fk 2 ; h k 1 ; that A N expects to get, A h will pick k 2 at random, use its oracle to compute hk 1 ; , and then compute fk 2 ; itself on the outcome. The two algorithms are depicted in full The algorithm A f is the same as in 2 . The algorithm A h was not explicitly given in 2 and is added to obtain the full proof of the concrete security claim we are making. Although the claims are essentially the same, we take a slightly di erent approach to the analysis than in 2 .
Towards establishing Equation 8 we consider some events in the experiment F orgeA N ; N . Namely A N Succeeds" denotes the event that this experiment returns 1, and E denotes the event that for the string x output by A N we have hk 1 ; x 6 2 fhk 1 ; x 1 ; : : : ; h k 1 ; x q N g . Below Pr refers to the probability under experiment F orgeA N ; N .
Adversary A f succeeds in an f-forgery if A N outputs a correct N-forgery for a message x 6 2 fx 1 ; : : : ; x q N g the event A N Succeeds" and hk 1 ; x 6 2 fhk 1 ; x 1 ; : : : ; h k 1 ; x q N g the event E.
Thus
Succ mac f A f = Pr A N succeeds^E :
9 However, if x 6 2 fx 1 ; : : : ; x q N g but hk 1 ; x = h k 1 ; x i for some i 2 f 1 ; : : : ; q N g namely E happens then x; x i is a collision pair for hk 1 ; and the algorithm A h will succeed in outputting a collision pair. Notice that for A h to output a correct collision pair for h, the success of A N is not required; that is, even if A N outputs an incorrect forgery, A h might succeed. Hence However, if we consider things in the context of the experiments, essentially the same operations ie. the computation of the functions based on the output of A N and whether it was queried before are performed either within the adversaries themselves or during their veri cation processes. To be precise, there might be some minor di erences in the sizes of the query sets and the functions that are computed in the veri cation process. However, these can beignored especially since we are not considering the exact running time but an upper bound on the running time. Hence, we conclude that the actual running times of the three experiments are essentially equal. To get what we called the running time we m ust also add in the size of the code of the adversaries in question. Adversaries A f ; A h put small, constant size wrappers" around the code of A N and hence their code size is that of A N plus O1. We have for simplicity ignored this minor additive constant in the time complexity since it is insigni cant in practice. To compute the numberof queries for each experiment, we consider the query set the set of all oracle queries of the adversary union with the adversary's message output associated with each experiment. For ForgeA N ; N , the query set is Q = fx 1 ; : : : ; x q N ; x g . F or ForgeA f ; f , the query set is Q f = fhk 1 ; x 1 ; : : : ; h k 1 ; x q N ; h k 1 ; x g since the queries are to the oracle fk 2 ; . For FindWeakColA h ; h , the query set is Q h = fx 1 ; : : : ; x q N ; x g since the queried oracle hk 1 ; takes the same input as the oracle N k 1 k 2 . Notice that x j the second part of the output pair output by A h is already included in the set Q h since it was chosen among the already queried strings.
Notice that jQ f j j Q j = j Q h j . By assumption jQj q so the query complexity of A f and A h is also at most q, as claimed. Since Q h = Q the total message complexity o f A h is the same as that of A, meaning at most . The total message complexity o f A f is jQ f j b + q b + since the length of each query to the oracle fk 2 ; is exactly b +`bits.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 4.3
Let C I beacollision-nder achieving the best possible success in attacking IT f , meaning it has resources at most t; q; and success Succ wcr IT f C I equal to InSec wcr IT f t; q; . We will construct a collision-nder C f attacking f so that the resources used by C f will be at most t 0 ; q 0 ; 0 |where t 0 = t, q 0 = =b and 0 = b + =b| and furthermore The collision-nder C f attacking f is presented in Figure 3 . Here we let X j denote the j-th b-bit block of a string X. We assume that queries and outputs of C I have length a multiple of the block length b, since appropriate padding is used to ensure this anyway. Our algorithm C f has an oracle for fk;, as perthe de nition of weak collision resistance. It begins by running C I . The latter makes oracle queries to IT f k; again, as per the de nition of weak collision resistance to which C f provides the replies by itself computing IT f k;. It can do the latter using its own oracle fk;in the manner depicted in the subroutine ComputeIT fk; . Accordingly C f answers all the oracle queries of C I , and then obtains the output X;X 0 of C I . Now it will use X;X 0 to try to nd a collision in fk;, and will succeed whenever X;X 0 was a collision for IT f k;. First note that if jXj 6 = j X 0 j then certainly IT f k;X6 = IT f k;X 0 . This is because the last b bits of IT f k;X equal hjXji while the last b bits of IT f k;X 0 equal hjX 0 ji, and the lengths are di erent b y assumption. Accordingly if jXj 6 = j X 0 j then C f returns Fail. We continue the analysis under the assumption that jXj = jX 0 j, and denote this common value by n. By assumption n is a multiple of the block length b and X = X 1 : : : X n and X 0 = X 0 1 : : : X 0 n . We now show that the Repeat loop of C f nds a collision in fk; under the assumption that X;X 0 is a collision in IT f k;. The quantities referred to in the following claim are as de ned in the code for the algorithm C f of Figure 3 .
Claim A.1 Suppose IT f k;X = I T f k;X 0 but X 6 = X 0 , where jXj = jX 0 j. Let n = jXj=b. Then there exists i 2 f 1 ; : : : ; n g such that y i , 1 kX i 6 = y 0 i , 1 kX 0 i but fk;y i,1 kX i = fk;y 0 i,1 kX 0 i . Proof: The argument i s b y induction on the length n of the messages. The base case of the induction is when n = 1. In this case IT f k;X=fk;y 0 kX 1 and IT f k;X 0 =fk;y 0 0 kX 0 1 , where y 0 = y 0 0 = 0`. Thus our assumptions say that fk;y 0 kX 1 = fk;y 0 kX 0 1 but X 1 6 = X 0 1 , meaning y 0 kX 1 ; y 0 k X 0 1 is a collision for fk;. In other words the claim is true with i = 1 . Now assume n 1. The induction hypothesis is that the claim is true for n , 1. We wish to establish the claim for n. The assumption is that IT f k;X= I T f k;X 0 but X 6 = X 0 , and n = jXj=b = jX 0 j=b. By Case 1: y n , 1 kX n 6 = y 0 n , 1 kX 0 n .
In this case, the claim is true with i = n. We did not even need to use the induction hypothesis.
Case 2: y n , 1 kX n = y 0 n , 1 kX 0 n . This means in particular that y n , 1 = y 0 n , 1 . Furthermore, since X n = X 0 n but X 6 = X 0 it must be that X 1 X n , 1 6 = X 0 1 X 0 n , 1 . Thus, the induction hypothesis tells us that there is an i 2 f 1 ; : : : ; n , 1 g for which the claim is true.
This completes the proof of Equation 11 . We n o w analyze the resource parameters in the context of the experiments FindWeakColC I ; IT f and FindWeakColC f ; f . Each experiment can be divided into three parts: key generation, computation for answers to oracle queries, and output veri cation. In FindWeakColC I ; IT f , algorithm C I is run directly while in FindWeakColC f ; f , it is run indirectly within the adversary C f . Since the two experiments run the same adversary C I , they have the same running time for the rst two parts key generation and computation of oracle queries up until C I outputs its string pair. After C I outputs the pair of strings, the experiment FindWeakColC I ; IT f veri es whether they are a collision pair by computing the function IT f k;on the output strings and comparing the results. This process roughly corresponds to the second loop in the algorithm for C f , where it nds a collision pair for the function fk;by computing the function fk; o f e a c h block in the output strings of C I and comparing the results until it nds a collision pair for fk;. Although there are some minor di erence in total lengths of strings compared |the total length of strings compared in FindWeakColC f ; f is slightly larger than that in FindWeakColC I ; IT f | if we assume the time for comparison is small enough, it is reasonable to ignore this di erence. This would hardly be an invalid assumption, since in general, compared to the time for the rest of the operations in either experiment, the time for the comparison of the nal output strings would be negligible. This tells us that the execution times are pretty m uch the same. Finally we m ust add in the the size of the code of the algorithms. That of C f is slightly more than that of C I , but again we decide to ignore this slight di erence. Upto a negligible di erence, we t h us claim that t 0 = t. Regarding the number of queries q 0 made to oracle fk;, notice that it may not be easily expressed in terms of q since each query to the oracle IT f k; may take a variable numberof queries to oracle fk;. Hence, we express q 0 in terms of the sum of the lengths of all messages queried and output by C I . To compute the numberof queries to fk;, we need to compute the total number of blocks in since each block in the queries for IT f k corresponds to the oracle query for fk;. The number of blocks in is obtained by dividing it by the block length b. Notice that the nal output message pair of C I may be only partly processed by C f since it stops once a collision pair is found for fk;. Since q 0 , b y de nition, is an upper-bound, q 0 = =b.
The sum of lengths of all queries of C f 0 can be computed by m ultiplying the number of queries by the length of each query. Since the length of each query for the oracle fk;is b +`and the number of queries is at most =b, w e h a v e 0 = b + =b.
A.3 Proof of Lemma 4.4
Let C be a collision-nder achieving the best possible success in attacking g, meaning it has resources at most t; q; and success Succ wcr g C equal to InSec wcr g t; q; . We will construct a forger A attacking g, so that the resources used by A will be at most t 0 ; q 0 ; 0 |where t 0 = t + O, q 0 = q and 0 = | and furthermore Succ mac g A 2, 1 Succ wcr g C :
12 Thus we h a v e InSec wcr g t; q; = Succ wcr g C, 1 2 Succ mac g A, 1 2 InSec mac g t 0 ; q 0 ; 0 ;
and Lemma 4.4 follows. The proof therefore reduces to presenting A to achieve Equation 12 while using the claimed resources.
Algorithm A gets an oracle for gk; so that it can mount a chosen-message attack. It runs C providing answers to C's queries using its own oracle. For simplicity assume that all the oracle queries made by C are distinct. Since C's oracle is deterministic, there is no reason to repeat an oracle query. Let Q C = fx 1 ; : : : ; x q C g denote the set of queries made by C and let y 0 ; y 1 denote the pair of strings output by C after it has completed its interaction with its oracle. We assume y 0 6 = y 1 since otherwise C cannot besuccessful. The query set of C is Q = Q C f y 0 ; y 1 g . By assumption it has size at most q, and we assume for simplicity it has size exactly q. We write Q = fx 1 ; : : : ; x q g . This means we h a v e assigned indices a; b such that y 0 = x a and y 1 = x b .
Notice that either y 0 or y 1 or both or neither may b e i n Q C : w e do not know a priori, and it may vary from execution to execution. If, say, y 0 is already in Q C , then a q C , and otherwise the range of the indices for the points in Q C is extended to accomodate y 0 . Similarly for y 1 . This inclusion of the collision points and queried points in a common indexed set is convenient to what follows.
Algorithm A is presented in Figure 4 . The idea is that A will pick two distinct points x j ; x i at random from Q and hope that they form a collision for gk;. It may beworth observing that q 2 due to the presence of the two assumed distinct points y 0 ; y 1 in the query set, so that the random choices of algorithm A are valid. If so we would have gk;x j =gk;x i . Then A will output x i ; g k;x j as a forgery. There is one catch: this is only valid if x i was not an oracle query of A. This requires, rst, that x i 6 = x j , but that is true because the points in Q are distinct by assumption. However, x i might h a v e been an oracle query of C, and in the process of answering the oracle queries of C, algorithm A would have answered this query, meaning would have queried its own oracle at x i . To make sure that A did not make oracle query x i , the execution of C is halted just after it outputs its i-th query and just before that query is answered. This is re ected in the code of A in the query reply stage, where the answer to oracle query x s of C is only provided if s i , 1. However, remember that fx 1 ; : : : ; x q g includes by de nition the points y 0 ; y 1 that are output by C.
In particular, the values of i or j might refer to these points. Accordingly the last part of the code of A makes sure that these points are assigned indices in the sense that each has the form x m for some m. If the point was already queried, its index has been assigned and there is nothing to do, but otherwise the running index s for the set of points must be incremented and the value x s assigned to the new point. Notice that this code is only executed if all queries of C have been answered not just asked, but answered; indeed, otherwise it is not even possible to continue running C. This means in particular that this code is executed when the chosen value of i is strictly more than the number of oracle queries actually made by C. Even if y 0 ; y 1 are not obtained by A because it did not reach that part of its code, we will refer to them in the correctness argument below. They are simply the values that C would have output had A continued to run it. These values are well-de ned because C's coins if any have been initially chosen at random and then xed by A.
Now let bethe unique value in f1; : : : ; q g such that y 0 = x and let bethe unique value in f1; : : : ; q g such that y 1 = x . Let a = max ; and b = min ; . Notice that 1 b a q and if C is successful then x b ; x a i s a collision for gk;. Let E be the event that i; j = a; b. We claim that if E happens then A is successful in nding a forgery for gk;. This requires checking two things: that gk;x j is a valid tag for x i , and that x i was not queried by A. Both are relatively easy to see. The rst is true because x i ; x j is a collision for gk;. The second is true because the code of A makes sure it does not query x i . Now since the numberof choices the veri cation of a forgery requires checking the newness of the message whereas that of a collision does not. Checking whether the output message of the forger is new with respect to its previous queries takes O. Hence, t 0 = t + O.
To compute the numberofqueries, we consider the query set. In ForgeA; g, the query set is a subset of fx 1 ; : : : ; x q g . Both strings y 0 ; y 1 are included in the set for ForgeA; g, since one of them is the output string of A and the other one is queried by A. Hence, q = q 0 and = 0 .
